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Scientific objectivity is a characteristic of scientific claims, methods and
results. It expresses the idea that the claims, methods and results of sci-
ence are not, or should not be influenced by particular perspectives, value
commitments, community bias or personal interests, to name a few relevant
factors. Objectivity is often considered as an ideal for scientific inquiry,
as a good reason for valuing scientific knowledge, and as the basis of the
authority of science in society.
Many central debates in the philosophy of science have, in one way or
another, to do with objectivity: confirmation and the problem of induction;
theory choice and scientific change; realism; scientific explanation; experi-
mentation; measurement and quantification; evidence and the foundations
of statistics; evidence-based science; feminism and values in science. Under-
standing the role objectivity plays in science is therefore integral to a full
appreciation of these debates. As this article testifies, the reverse is true
too: it is impossible to fully appreciate the notion of scientific objectivity
without touching upon many of these debates.
The ideal of objectivity has been criticized repeatedly in philosophy of
science, questioning both its value and its attainability. This article focuses
on the question of whether the concept of objectivity plays a guiding role for
modern science, whether the ideal of objectivity is desirable at all, and to
what extent scientists can achieve it. In line with the idea that the epistemic
authority of science relies primarily on the objectivity of scientific reasoning,
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1 Introduction: Product and Process Objectivity
Objectivity is a value. To call a thing objective implies that it has a certain
degree of importance to us and that we approve of it. Objectivity comes in
degrees. Claims, methods and results can be more or less objective, and,
other things being equal, the more objective, the better. Using the term
‘objective’ to describe something often carries a special rhetorical force with
it. The admiration of science among the general public and the authority
science enjoys in public life stems to a large extent from the view that
science is objective or at least more objective than other modes of inquiry.
Understanding scientific objectivity is therefore central to understanding the
nature of science and the role it plays in society.
Given the centrality of the concept for science and everyday life, it is not
surprising that attempts to find ready characterizations are bound to fail.
For one thing, there are two fundamentally different ways to understand
the term: product objectivity and process objectivity. According to
the first understanding, science is objective in that, or to the extent that,
its products—theories, laws, experimental results and observations, ‘facts’—
constitute accurate representations of the external world. The products of
science according to this view are not tainted by human desires, goals, ca-
pabilities or experience. According to the second understanding, science is
objective in that, or to the extent that, the processes and methods that char-
acterize it neither depend on contingent social and ethical values, nor on the
individual bias of a scientist. Especially this second understanding is itself
multi-faceted; it contains, inter alia, explications in terms of measurement
procedures, individual reasoning processes, or the social and institutional
dimension of science. The semantic richness of scientific objectivity is also
reflected in the multitude of categorizations and subdivisions of the concept
(e.g., Megill 1994; Douglas 2004).
If it is true that what is so great about science is its objectivity, then
objectivity should be worth defending. The close examinations of scientific
practice that philosophers of science have undertaken in the past fifty years
have shown, however, that several conceptions of the ideal of objectivity are
either questionable or unattainable. The prospects for a science providing a
non-perspectival ‘view from nowhere’ or for proceeding in a way uninformed
by human goals and values are fairly slim, for example.
This article discusses several proposals to characterize the idea and ideal
of objectivity in such a way that it is both strong enough to be valuable,
and weak enough to be attainable and workable in practice. We begin with
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a natural conception of objectivity: faithfulness to facts, which is closely
related to the idea of product objectivity. We motivate the intuitive appeal
of this conception, discuss its relation to scientific method and discuss argu-
ments challenging both its attainability as well as its desirability. We then
move on to a second conception of objectivity as absence of normative
commitments and value-freedom, and once more we contrast arguments
in favor of such a conception with the challenges it faces. The third con-
ception of objectivity which we discuss at length is the idea of absence
of personal bias. After discussing three case studies about objectivity in
scientific practice (from economics, social science and medicine) as well as a
radical alternative to the traditional conceptions of objectivity, instrumen-
talism, we draw some conclusions about what aspects of objectivity remain
defensible and desirable in the light of the difficulties we have discussed.
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2 Objectivity as Faithfulness to Facts
The idea of this first conception of objectivity is that scientific claims are
objective in so far as they faithfully describe facts about the world. The
philosophical rationale underlying this conception of objectivity is the view
that there are facts ‘out there’ in the world and that it is the task of a
scientist to discover, analyze and to systematize them. ‘Objective’ then
becomes a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures
some feature of the world.
In this view, science is objective to the degree that it succeeds at discover-
ing and generalizing facts, abstracting from the perspective of the individual
scientist. Although few philosophers have fully endorsed such a conception
of scientific objectivity, the idea figures recurrently in the work of prominent
20th century philosophers of science such as Carnap, Hempel, Popper, and
Reichenbach. It is also, in an evident way, related to the claims of scientific
realism, according to which it is the task of science to find out the truths
about the world, and according to which we have reason to believe in the
truth of our best-confirmed scientific theories.
2.1 The View From Nowhere
Humans experience the world from a perspective. The contents of an in-
dividual’s experiences vary greatly with the individual’s perspective, which
is affected by his or her personal situation, details of his or her perceptual
apparatus, language and culture, the physical conditions in which the per-
spective is made. While the experiences vary, there seems to be something
that remains constant. The appearance of a tree will change as one ap-
proaches it but, at least possibly, the tree itself doesn’t. A room may feel
hot or cold depending on the climate one is used to but it will, at least
possibly, have a degree of warmth that is independent of one’s experiences.
The object in front of a person does not, at least not necessarily, disappear
just because the lights are turned off.
There is a conception of objectivity that presupposes that there are two
kinds of qualities: ones that vary with the perspective one has or takes, and
ones that remain constant through changes of perspective. The latter are
the objective properties. Thomas Nagel explains that we arrive at the idea
of objective properties in three steps (Nagel 1986: 14). The first step is to
realize (or postulate) that our perceptions are caused by the actions of things
on us, through their effects on our bodies. The second step is to realize (or
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postulate) that since the same properties that cause perceptions in us also
have effects on other things and can exist without causing any perceptions at
all, their true nature must be detachable from their perspectival appearance
and need not resemble it. The final step is to form a conception of that ‘true
nature’ independently of any perspective. Nagel calls that conception the
‘view from nowhere’, Bernard Williams the ‘absolute conception’ (Williams
2011[1985]). It represents the world as it is, unmediated by human minds
and other ‘distortions’.
Many scientific realists maintain that science, or at least natu-
ral science, does and indeed ought to aim to describe the world in
terms of this absolute conception and that it is to some extent suc-
cessful in doing so (for a detailed discussion of scientific realism, see
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/). There is an immedi-
ate sense in which the absolute conception is an attractive one to have. If
two people looking at a colored patch in front of them disagree whether it
is green or brown, the absolute conception provides an answer to the ques-
tion (e.g., ‘The patch emits light at a wavelength of 510 nanometers’). By
making these facts accessible through, say, a spectroscope, we can arbitrate
between the conflicting viewpoints (viz., by stating that the patch should
look green to a normal observer in daylight).
Another reason for this conception to be attractive is that it will pro-
vide for a simpler and more unified representation of the world. Theories of
trees will be very hard to come by if they use predicates such as ‘height as
seen by an observer’ and a hodgepodge if their predicates track the habits
of ordinary language users rather than the properties of the world. To the
extent, then, that science aims to provide explanations for natural phenom-
ena, casting them in terms of the absolute conception would help to realize
this aim. Bernard Williams makes a related point about explanation: ‘The
substance of the absolute conception (as opposed to those vacuous or van-
ishing ideas of ‘the world’ that were offered before) lies in the idea that it
could nonvacuously explain how it itself, and the various perspectival views
of the world, are possible’ (Williams 2011[1985]: 139). Thus, a scientific
account cast in the language of the absolute conception may not only be
able to explain why a tree is as tall as it is but also why we see it in one
way when viewed from one standpoint and in a different way when viewed
from another.
A third possible reason to find the view from nowhere attractive is that
if the world came in structures as characterized by it and we did have access
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to it, we can use our knowledge of it to ground predictions (which, to the
extent that our theories do track the absolute structures, will be borne out).
A fourth and related reason is that attempts to manipulate and control
phenomena can similarly be grounded in our knowledge of these structures.
To attain any of the four purposes—settling disagreements, explaining the
world, predicting phenomena and manipulation and control—the absolute
conception is at best sufficient but not necessary. We can, for instance,
settle disagreements by imposing the rule that the person who speaks first
is always right or the person who is of higher social rank or by an agreed-
upon measurement procedure that does not track absolute height. We can
explain the world and our image of it by means of theories that do not
represent absolute structures and properties, and there is no need to get
things (absolutely) right in order to predict successfully. Nevertheless, there
is something appealing in the idea that disagreements concerning certain
matters of fact can be settled by the very facts themselves, that explanations
and predictions grounded in what’s really there rather than in a distorted
image of it.
No matter how desirable, it is clear that our ability to use scientific claims
to represent all and only facts about the world depends on whether these
claims can unambiguously be established on the basis of evidence. We test
scientific claims by means of their implications, and it is an elementary prin-
ciple of logic that claims whose implications are true need not themselves
be true. It is the job of scientific method to make sure that observations,
measurements, experiments, tests—the scientific evidence—speak in favor
of the scientific claim at hand. Alas, the relation between evidence and sci-
entific hypothesis is not straightforward. In the next two subsections we will
look at two challenges of the idea that even the best scientific method will
yield claims that describe an aperspectival view from nowhere. Subsection
2.4 will challenge the idea that the view from nowhere is a good thing to
have.
2.2 Theory-Ladenness and Incommensurability
According to a popular picture, science progresses toward truth by adding
true and eliminating false beliefs from our best scientific theroies. By making
these theories more and more verisimilar, that is, truthlike, scientific knowl-
edge grows over time (e.g., Popper 1963). If this picture is correct, then over
time, scientific knowledge will become more objective, that is, more faithful
to facts. However, scientific theories often change, and sometimes several
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theories compete for the place of the best scientific account of the world.
It is inherent in the above picture of scientific objectivity that observa-
tions can, at least in principle, decide between competing theories: if they
did not, the conception of objectivity as faithfulness would be a pointless
one to have, as we would not be in a position to verify it. This position has
been adopted by Karl R. Popper, Rudolf Carnap and other leading figures
in (broadly) empiricist philosophy of science. Many philosophers have ar-
gued that the relation between observation and theory is way more complex
and that influences can actually run both ways (e.g, Duhem 1906, Wittgen-
stein 1953/2001, Hanson 1958). The most lasting criticism, however, was
delivered by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962/1970) in his book ‘The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions’.
Kuhn’s analysis is built on the assumption that scientists always view
research problems through the lens of a paradigm, defined by set of relevant
problems, axioms, methodological presuppositions, techniques, and so forth.
Kuhn provided several historical examples in favor of this claim. Scientific
progress—and the practice of normal, everyday science—happens within a
paradigm that guides the individual scientists’ puzzle-solving work and that
sets the community standards.
Can observations undermine such a paradigm, and speak for a different
one? Here, Kuhn famously stresses that observations are ‘theory-laden’
(cf. also Hanson 1958): they depend on a body of theoretical assumptions
through which they are perceived and conceptualized. This hypothesis has
two important aspects.
First, the meaning of observational concepts is influenced by theoreti-
cal assumptions and presuppositions. For example, the concepts ‘mass’ and
‘length’ have different meanings in Newtonian and relativistic mechanics;
so does the concept ‘temperature’ in thermodynamics and statistical me-
chanics (cf. Feyerabend 1962). In other words, Kuhn denies that there is
a theory-independent observation language. The ‘faithfulness to reality’ of
an observation report is always mediated by a theoretical U¨berbau, impair-
ing the role of observation reports as an impartial, merely fact-dependent
arbiter between different theories.
Second, not only the observational concepts, but also the perception of
a scientist depends on the paradigm she is working in. ‘Practicing in differ-
ent worlds, the two groups of scientists [who work in different paradigms,
J.R./J.S.] see different things when they look from the same point in the
same direction’ (Kuhn 1962/1970: 150). That is, our own sense data are
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shaped and structured by a theoretical framework, and may be fundamen-
tally distinct from the sense data of scientists working in another one. If
this picture is correct, it is hard to assess which theory or paradigm is more
faithful to the facts, that is, more objective.
The thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation has also been extended
to the incommensurability of different paradigms or scientific the-
ories, problematized independently by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962/1970) and
Paul Feyerabend (1962). Literally, this concept means “having no mea-
sure in common”, and it figures prominently in arguments against a linear
and standpoint-independent picture of scientific progress. For instance, the
Special Theory of Relativity appears to be more objective than Newtonian
mechanics because it reduces, for low speeds, to the latter, and it accounts
for some additional facts as well. This picture is undermined, however, by
two central aspects of incommensurability. First, not only do the observa-
tional concepts in both theories differ, but the principles for specifying their
meaning may be inconsistent with each other (Feyerabend 1975, 269–270).
Second, scientific research methods and standards of evaluation change with
the theories or paradigms. Not all puzzles that could be tackled in the old
paradigm will be solved by the new one—this is the phenomenon of ‘Kuhn
loss’.
A meaningful use of objectivity presupposes, according to Feyerabend,
to perceive and to describe the world from a specific perspective, e.g., when
we try to verify the referential claims of a scientific theory. Only within
a peculiar scientific worldview, the concept of objectivity may be applied
meaningfully. That is, scientific method cannot free itself from the particular
scientific theory to which it is applied; the door to standpoint-independence
is locked. As Feyerabend puts it: ‘our epistemic activities may have a
decisive influence even upon the most solid piece of cosmological furniture—
they make gods disappear and replace them by heaps of atom in empty space’
(1978: 70).
Kuhn and Feyerabend’s theses about theory-ladenness of observa-
tion, and their implications for the objectivity of scientific inquiry have
been much debated afterwards, and have often been misunderstood in
a social constructivist sense. Therefore Kuhn later returned to the
topic of scientific objectivity, of which he gives his own characterization
in terms of the shared cognitive values of a scientific community. We
discuss Kuhn’s later view in section 3. For a more profound coverage,
see Section 3 in the SEP entry on the incommensurability of scien-
10
tific theories (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/)
and Section 4.2. in the SEP entry on Thomas S. Kuhn
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/).
2.3 The Experimenter’s Regress
Most of the earlier critics of ‘objective’ verification or falsification focused
on the relation between evidence and scientific theories. There is a sense in
which the claim that this relation is problematic is not so surprising. Sci-
entific theories contain highly abstract claims that describe states of affairs
far removed from the immediacy of sense experience. This is for a good rea-
son: sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which
scientific theories are to track the absolute conception, they must describe a
world different from that of sense experience. But surely, one might think,
the evidence itself is objective. So even if we do have reasons to doubt that
abstract theories faithfully represent the world, we should stand on firmer
grounds when it comes to the evidence against which we test abstract the-
ories.
Theories are seldom tested against brute observations, however. This
too is for good reason: if they were, they’d be unlikely to track the abso-
lute conception. Simple generalizations such as ‘all swans are white’ are
directly learned from observations (say, of the color of swans) but they do
not represent the view from nowhere (for one thing, the view from nowhere
doesn’t have colors). Genuine scientific theories are tested against experi-
mental facts or phenomena, which are themselves unobservable to the un-
aided senses. Experimental facts or phenomena are instead established using
intricate procedures of scientific measurement and experimentation.
We therefore need to ask whether the results of scientific measurements
and experiments can be aperspectival. In an important debate in the 1980s
and 1990s some commentators answered that question with a resounding
‘no’, which was then rebutted by others. The debate concerns the so-called
‘experimenter’s regress’ (Collins 1985). Collins, a prominent sociologist of
science, claims that in order to know whether an experimental result is
correct, one first needs to know whether the apparatus producing the result
is reliable. But one doesn’t know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one
knows that it produces correct results in the first place and so on and so on
ad infinitum. Collins’ main case concerns attempts to detect gravitational
waves, which were very controversially discussed among physicists in the
1970s.
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Collins argues that the circle is eventually broken not by the ‘facts’ them-
selves but rather by factors having to do with the scientist’s career, the social
and cognitive interests of his community, and the expected fruitfulness for
future work. It is important to note that in Collins’s view these factors do
not necessarily make scientific results arbitrary. But what he does argue
is that the experimental results do not represent the world according to
the absolute conception. Rather, they are produced jointly by the world,
scientific apparatuses, and the psychological and sociological factors men-
tioned above. The facts and phenomena of science are therefore necessarily
perspectival.
In a series of contributions, Allan Franklin, a physicist-turned-
philosopher of science, has tried to show that while there are indeed no
algorithmic procedures for establishing experimental facts, disagreements
can nevertheless be settled by reasoned judgement on the basis of bona
fide epistemological criteria such as experimental checks and calibration,
elimination of possible sources of error, using apparatuses based on well-
corroborated theory and so on (Franklin 1994; 1997). Collins responds that
‘reasonableness’ is a social category that is not drawn from physics (Collins
1994).
The main issue for us in this debate is whether there are any reasons to
believe that experimental results provide an aperspectival view on the world.
According to Collins, experimental results are co-determined by the facts as
well as social and psychological factors. According to Franklin, whatever else
influences experimental results other than facts is not arbitrary but instead
based on reasoned judgment. What he has not shown is that reasoned
judgment guarantees that experimental results reflect the facts alone and
are therefore aperspectival in any interesting sense.
2.4 Standpoint Theory, Contextual Empiricism and Trust in
Science
Feminist standpoint theorists and proponents of ‘situated knowledge’ such
as Donna Haraway (1988), Sandra Harding (1993) and Alison Wylie (2003)
deny the internal coherence of a view from nowhere: all human knowledge
is at base human knowledge and is therefore necessarily perspectival. But
they argue more than that. Not only is perspectivality the human condition,
it is also a good thing to have. This is because perspectives, especially the
perspectives of underprivileged classes, come along with certain epistemic
advantages.
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Standpoint theory is a development of certain Marxist ideas that epis-
temic position is related to social position. According to this view, workers,
being members of an underprivileged class, have both greater incentives to
understand social relations better, and better access because they live under
the capitalists’ rule and therefore have access to the lives of capitalists as
well as their own lives. Feminist standpoint theory builds on these ideas but
focuses on gender, racial and other social relations.
These ideas are controversial but they draw attention to the possibility
that attempts to rid science of perspectives might not only be futile because
scientific knowledge is necessarily perspectival, they can also be epistemically
costly because they prevent scientists from having the epistemic benefits
certain standpoints afford.
If there are no methods that guarantee objective outcomes or objective
criteria against which to assess outcomes, what might ‘procedural objectiv-
ity’ consist in? A particularly answer that goes back to Karl R. Popper
(1972, 1934/2002) has been taken up and modified by Helen Longino. Pop-
per claimed that ‘the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact
that they can be inter-subjectively tested’ (1934/2002: 22), where ‘inter-
subjectively testable’ may be understood as there being verifiable facts with
evidential bearing on the theory in question. So Popper does not see the
objectivity of a scientific claim in a direct correspondence to facts: rather,
the claim must be testable and subject to rational criticism.
Longino (1990) reinforces Popper’s focus on intersubjective criticism: for
her, scientific knowledge is essentially a social product. Thus, our concep-
tion of scientific objectivity must directly engage with the social process
that generates knowledge. In response to the failures of attempts to define
objectivity as faithfulness of theory to facts, she concludes that social crit-
icism fulfills crucial functions in securing the epistemic success of science.
The objectivity of science is no more grounded in correspondence between
theory and facts, or in all scientists seeing the same result (called ‘concor-
dant objectivity’ by Douglas 2011), but in the ‘interactive objectivity’ that
emerges through the scientists’ open discourse. Specifically, she develops an
epistemology called contextual empiricism which regards a method of in-
quiry as ‘objective to the degree that it permits transformative criticism’
(Longino 1990: 76). For an epistemic community to achieve transformative
criticism, there must be:
1) avenues for criticism: criticism is an essential part of scientific in-
stitutions (e.g., peer review);
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2) shared standards: the community must share a set of cognitive
values for assessing theories (more on this in Section 3);
3) uptake of criticism: criticism must be able to transform scientific
practice in the long run;
4) equality of intellectual authority: intellectual authority must be
shared equally among qualified practitioners.
Longino’s contextual empiricism can be understood as a development
of John Stuart Mill’s view that beliefs should never be suppressed, inde-
pendently of whether they are true or false (Mill 1859). Even the most
implausible beliefs might, for all we know, be true as we are not infallible;
and if they are false, they might contain a grain of truth which is worth pre-
serving or, if wholly false, help to better articulate and defend those beliefs
which are true (Mill 1859: 72).
Social epistemologists such as Longino similarly see objectivity neither in
the products of science (as there is no view from nowhere) nor in its methods
(as there aren’t any standards that are valid independently of the contexts of
specific inquiries) but rather in the idea that many and competing voices are
heard. The underlying intuition is supported by recent empirical research
on the epistemic benefits of a diversity of opinions and perspectives (Page
2007).
The turn from scientific results and methods to the social organization
of science involves numerous problems. On the one hand, we might ask
how many and which voices must be heard for science to be objective. It is
not clear for instance whether non-scientists should have as much author-
ity as trained scientists. The condition of equality of intellectual requires
only ‘qualified’ practitioners to equaly share authority—but who qualifies
as ‘qualified’? Nor is it clear whether it is always a good idea to subject
every scientific result to democratic approval, as Paul Feyerabend proposed
(Feyerabend 1975, 1978). On the other hand, there is certainly no guarantee
that democratized science leads to true theories, or even reliable ones. So
why should we value objectivity in the sense of social epistemologists?
One answer to this question has been given by Arthur Fine who argues
that we value objectivity in this sense because it promotes trust in science
(Fine 1998: 17). While there is no guarantee that the process leads to true
theories, it is nevertheless trusted because it is fair. We will consider Fine’s
views on objectivity in more detail below in Section 6.
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3 Objectivity as Absence of Normative Commit-
ments and the Value-Free Ideal
The previous section has presented us with forceful arguments against the
view of objectivity as faithfulness to facts and an impersonal ‘view from
nowhere’. How can we maintain the view that objectivity is one of the
essential features of science—and the one that grounds its epistemic author-
ity? A popular reply contends that science should be value-free and that
scientific claims or practices are objective to the extent that they are free of
moral, political and social values.
3.1 Epistemic and Contextual Values
Before addressing what we will call the ‘value-free ideal’, it will be helpful
to distinguish four stages at which values may affect science. They are: (i)
the choice of a scientific research problem; (ii) the gathering of evidence
in relation to the problem; (iii) the acceptance of a scientific hypothesis or
theory as an adequate answer to the problem on the basis of the evidence;
(iv) the proliferation and application of scientific research results (cf. Weber
1917/1988).
Most philosophers of science would agree that the role of values in science
is contentious only with respect to dimensions (ii) and (iii): the gathering
of evidence and the acceptance of scientific theories. It is almost
universally accepted that the choice of a research problem is often influenced
by the interests of individual scientists, funding parties, and society as a
whole. This influence may make science more shallow and slow down its
long-run progress, but it has benefits, too: scientists will focus on providing
solutions to those intellectual problems that are considered urgent by society
and they may actually improve people’s lifes. Similarly, the proliferation and
application of scientific research results is evidently affected by the personal
values of journal editors and end users, and there seems to be little one
can do about this. The real debate is about whether or not the ‘core’
of scientific reasoning—the gathering of evidence and the assessment and
acceptance scientific theories—is, and should be, value-free.
An obvious, but unconvincing objection invokes the ‘underdetermina-
tion of theory by evidence’ (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-
underdetermination/). As we have seen above, the relationship between
theory and evidence is rather complex. More often than not in the history
of science, the existing body of evidence in some domain does not pick out
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a unique theoretical account of that domain. ‘Crucial experiments’ do not
refute a specific scientific claim, but only indicate that there is an error in
an entire network of hypotheses (Duhem 1906/1954). Thus, existing bodies
of evidence often underdetermine the choice of rival theoretical accounts.
The gap between evidence and theory is filled in by scientific values.
Consider the curve-fitting problem. When fitting a curve to a data set, the
researcher often has the choice between either using a higher-order polyno-
mial, which makes the curve less simple but fit the data more accurately,
or using a lower-order polynomial, which makes the curve simpler albeit
less accurate. Simplicity and accuracy are both scientific values: for in-
stance, econometricians have a preference for solving curve-fitting problems
by means of linear regression, thereby valuing simplicity over accuracy.
Philosophers of science tend to regard value-ladenness in this sense as
benign. Epistemic (or cognitive) values such as predictive accuracy,
scope, unification, explanatory power, simplicity and coherence with other
accepted theories are taken to be indicative of a good scientific theory and
figure in standard arguments for preferring one theory over another. Kuhn
(1977) even claims that epistemic values define the shared commitments of
science, that is, the standards which scientists have used at all times for
assessing the merits of a theory.
A word on terminology. Sometimes epistemic values are regarded as
a subset of cognitive values and identified with values such as empirical
adequacy and internal consistency that directly bear on the veracity of
a scientific theory (Laudan 2004). Values such as scope and explanatory
power would then count as cognitive values that express scientific desider-
ata, but without properly epistemic implications. We have decided, however,
to adopt a broader reading of ‘epistemic’ where truth is not the only aim of
scientific inquiry, but supplemented by providing causal mechanisms, find-
ing natural laws, creating understanding, etc. In this sense, values such
as scope or explanatory power contribute to achieving our epistemic goals.
In addition, neat distinctions between truth-conducive and purely cognitive
scientific values are hard to come by (see Douglas 2013 for a classification
attempt).
Not every philosopher entertains the same list of epistemic values. In Ly-
can’s (1985) pragmatic perspective, simplicity is included because it reduces
the cognitive workload of the scientific practitioner, and because it facilitates
the use of scientific theories in dealing with real-world problems. McMullin
(2009), on the other hand, does not include simplicity because the notion
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is ambiguous, and because there are no conclusive arguments that simpler
theories are more likely to be true, or empirically adequate. Subjective dif-
ferences in ranking and applying epistemic values do not vanish, a point
Kuhn made emphatically. This is also one of the reasons for using the term
‘value’ rather than ‘rule’: the assessment of a scientific theory rather corre-
sponds to a judgment where different criteria are carefully weighed than to
the mechanic application of a rule or algorithm to determine the best theory
(McMullin 1982: 17).
In most views, the objectivity and authority of science is not threatened
by epistemic, but by non-cognitive, contextual values. Contextual val-
ues are moral, personal, social, political and cultural values such as pleasure,
justice and equality, conservation of the natural environment and diversity.
The most notorious cases of improper uses of such values involve traves-
ties of scientific reasoning, where the intrusion of contextual values led to
an intolerant and oppressive scientific agenda with devastating epistemic
and social consequences. In the Third Reich, a large part of contemporary
physics, such as the theory of relativity, was condemned because its inventors
were Jewish; in the Soviet Union, biologist Nikolai Vavilov was sentenced to
death (and died in prison) because his theories of genetic inheritance did not
match Marxist-Leninist ideology. Both states tried to foster a science that
was motivated by political convictions (Lenard’s ‘Deutsche Physik’ in Nazi
Germany, Lysenko’s anti-genetic theory of inheritance in the Soviet Union),
leading to disastrous epistemic and institutional effects.
Less spectacular but numerically more significant cases analyzed by fem-
inist philosophers of science involve gender or racial bias in biological theo-
ries (e.g., Okruhlik 1994, Lloyd 2005). Moreover, a lot of industry-sponsored
research in medicine (and elsewhere) is demonstrably biased toward the in-
terests of the sponsors, usually large pharmaceutic firms (e.g., Resnik 2007;
Reiss 2010). This preference bias, defined by Wilholt (2009) as the in-
fringement of conventional standards of the research community, with the
aim of arriving at a particular result, is clearly epistemically harmful. Es-
pecially for sensitive high-stakes issues such as the admission of medical
drugs or the consequences of anthropogenic global warming, it seems desir-
able that research scientists assess theories without being influenced by such
considerations. This is the core idea of the
Value-Free Ideal (VFI): Scientists should strive to minimize
the influence of contextual values on scientific reasoning, e.g., in
gathering evidence and assessing/accepting scientific theories.
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According to the VFI, scientific objectivity is characterized by absence
of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in
scientific reasoning. See Dorato (2004: 53–54), Ruphy (2006: 190) or Biddle
(2013: 125) for alternative formulations.
The next question is then whether the VFI is actually attainable. This
is the subject of the
Value-Neutrality Thesis (VNT): Scientists can—at least in
principle—gather evidence and assess/accept theories without
making contextual value judgments.
While this latter thesis is defended less frequently than the VFI, it serves
as a useful foil for discussing its attainability. Note that the VNT is not
normative: it only investigates whether the judgments that scientists make
are, or could be, free of contextual values.
The VNT is denied by the value-laden thesis, which asserts that contex-
tual values are essential for scientific research.
Value-Laden Thesis (VLT): Scientists cannot gather evi-
dence and assess/accept theories without making contextual
value judgments.
The latter thesis is sometimes strengthened to the claim that both epistemic
and contextual values are essential to scientific research—and pursuit of a
science without contextual values would be harmful both epistemically and
socially (see Section 3.4). Either way, the acceptance of the value-laden
thesis poses a challenge for re-defining scientific objectivity: one can either
conclude that the ideal of objectivity is harmful and should be rejected (as
Feyerabend does), or one can come up with a different and refined conception
of objectivity (as Douglas and Longino do).
This section discusses the VNT as applied to the assessment and accep-
tance of scientific hypothesis, the role of the VFI at the interface between
scientific reasoning and policy advice, and Paul Feyerabend’s radical attack
on the VNT.
3.2 Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses and Value Neutral-
ity
Regarding the assessment of scientific theories, the VNT is a relatively recent
position in philosophy of science. Its rise is closely connected to Reichen-
bach’s famous distinction between context of discovery and context of
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justification. Reichenbach first made this distinction with respect to the
epistemology of mathematics:
‘the objective relation from the given entities to the solution,
and the subjective way of finding it, are clearly separated for
problems of a deductive character [. . . ] we must learn to make
the same distinction for the problem of the inductive relation
from facts to theories’. (Reichenbach 1938: 36–37)
The standard interpretation of this statement marks contextual values,
which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, as irrelevant for
justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears
on theory—the relation that is crucial for the objectivity of science. Con-
textual values are restricted to a matter of individual psychology that may
influence the discovery, development and proliferation of a scientific theory,
but not its epistemic status.
This distinction played a crucial role in post-World War II philosophy of
science. It presupposes, however, a clear-cut distinction between epistemic
values on the one hand and contextual values on the other. While this
may be prima facie plausible for disciplines such as physics, there is an
abundance of contextual values in the social sciences, for instance, in the
conceptualization and measurement of a nation’s wealth, or in different ways
to measure the inflation rate (cf. Dupre´ 2007; Reiss 2008). More generally,
three major lines of criticism can be identified.
First, Helen Longino (1996) has argued that traditional ‘epistemic’ values
such as consistency, simplicity, breadth of scope and fruitfulness are not
purely epistemic after all, and that their use imports political and social
values into contexts of scientific judgment. According to her, the use of
epistemic values in scientific judgments is not always, not even normally,
politically neutral—she proposes to juxtapose these values with feminist
values such as novelty, ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of interaction,
applicability to human needs and diffusion of power. Longino’s argument is
different from the one in Section 3.1 that scientists may rationally disagree
about epistemic values: it casts the entire epistemic/contextual distinction
into doubt.
The use of language in descriptions of scientific hypotheses and re-
sults poses a second challenge to VNT. As Hilary Putnam has recently
argued, fact and value are frequently entangled because of the use of so-
called ‘thick’ ethical concepts in scientific descriptions (Putnam 2002). Con-
sider Putnam’s own example, the word ‘cruel’. The statement ‘Susan is a
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cruel teacher’ entails certain statements about Susan’s behavior towards her
pupils, perhaps that she gives unnecessarily low grades, puts them on the
spot, pokes fun at them or slaps them. It has descriptive content. But it also
expresses our moral disapproval of Susan’s behavior. To call someone cruel
is to reprehend him or her. The term has therefore also normative content.
Thick ethical terms are terms that, like cruel, have a mixed descriptive and
normative content. They contrast with ‘thin’ ethical terms that are purely
normative: ‘good’/‘bad’, ‘ought’/‘must not’, ‘right’/‘wrong’ and so on.
Putnam argues at some length that (a) the normative content of thick
ethical terms is ineliminable; and (b) thick ethical concepts cannot be fac-
tored into descriptive and normative components. Neither of these argu-
ments would, if successful, necessarily cause concern for a defender of the
VNT. The existence of terms in which facts and values are inextricably
entangled does not pose a threat to scientists who wish to describe their
hypotheses and results in a value-free manner: they could simply avoid us-
ing thick ethical terms. The crucial question is therefore whether or not
scientific hypotheses and the description of results necessarily involves such
terms.
John Dupre´ has argued that thick ethical terms are ineliminable from
science, at least certain parts of it (Dupre´ 2007). Dupre´’s point is essentially
that scientific hypotheses and results concern us because they are relevant
to human interests, they will necessarily be couched in a language that uses
thick ethical terms. While it will often be possible to translate ethically
thick descriptions into neutral ones, the translation cannot be made with-
out losses, and these losses obtain precisely because human interests are
involved. According to Dupre´, then, there are many scientific statements
that are value-free but they are value-free because their truth or falsity does
not matter to us (31):
Whether electrons have a positive or a negative charge and
whether there is a black hole in the middle of our galaxy are
questions of absolutely no immediate importance to us. The
only human interests they touch (and these they may indeed
touch deeply) are cognitive ones, and so the only values that
they implicate are cognitive values.
A third challenge to VNT was posed by Richard Rudner in his influen-
tial article ‘The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments’ (Rudner
1953). Rudner disputes the core of the VNT and the context of discov-
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ery/justification distinction: the idea that the acceptance of a scientific the-
ory can in principle be value-free. We now discuss Rudner’s argument in
some detail.
First, Rudner argues that ‘no analysis of what constitutes the method of
science would be satisfactory unless it comprised some assertion to the effect
that the scientist as scientist accepts or rejects hypotheses’ (1953: 2).
This assumption stems from the practice of industrial quality control and
other application-oriented research. In such contexts, it is often necessary
to accept or to reject a hypothesis (e.g., the efficacy of a drug) in order to
make effective decisions.
Second, he notes that no scientific hypothesis is ever confirmed beyond
reasonable doubt—some probability of error always remains. When we ac-
cept or reject a hypothesis, there is always a chance that our decision is
mistaken. Hence, our decision is also ‘a function of the importance, in the
typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting a hy-
pothesis’ (ibid.): we are balancing the seriousness of two possible errors
(erroneous acceptance/rejection of the hypothesis) against each other.
Hence, ethical judgments and contextual values enter the scientist’s core
activity of accepting and rejecting hypotheses, and the VNT stands refuted.
Closely related arguments can be found in Churchman (1948) and Braith-
waite (1953). Hempel (1965: 91-92) gives a modified account of Rudner’s
argument by distinguishing between judgments of confirmation, where val-
ues lack any logical relevance, and judgments of acceptance. Since even
strongly confirming evidence cannot fully prove a universal scientific law,
we have to live with a residual ‘inductive risk’ in inferring that law. Con-
textual values influence scientific methods by determining the acceptable
amount of inductive risk.
But how general are Rudner’s findings? Apparently, the result holds true
of applied science, but not necessarily of fundamental research. For
instance, Richard Jeffrey (1956) notes that lawlike hypotheses in theoretical
science (e.g., the gravitational law in Newtonian mechanics) are character-
ized by their general scope and not confined to a particular application.
Obviously, a scientist cannot fine-tune her decisions to their possible conse-
quences in a wide variety of different contexts. So she should just refrain at
all from accepting or rejecting hypotheses and restrict herself to gathering
and interpreting the evidence. This objection was foreshadowed by the great
statistician, methodologist and geneticist Ronald A. Fisher:
in the field of pure research no assessment of the cost of wrong
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conclusions [. . . ] can conceivably be more than a pretence, and in
any case such an assessment would be inadmissible and irrelevant
in judging the state of the scientific evidence. (Fisher 1935: 25–
26, our emphasis)
By restricting scientific reasoning to gathering and interpreting evidence,
possibly supplemented by assessing the probability of a hypothesis, and
abandoning the business of accepting/rejecting hypotheses, Jeffrey tries to
save the VNT in fundamental scientific research, and the objectivity of sci-
entific reasoning.
A related attempt to save the VNT is given by Isaac Levi (1960). Levi
observes that scientists commit themselves to certain standards of inference
when they become a member of the profession. This may, for example,
lead to the statistical rejection of a hypothesis when the observed signifi-
cance level is smaller than 5%. These community standards may eliminate
any room for contextual ethical judgment on behalf of the scientist: they
determine when he/she should accept a hypothesis as established. Value
judgments may be implicit in the standards of scientific inference, but not
in the daily work of an individual scientist. Such conventional standards
are especially prolific in theoretical research where it does not make sense to
specify application-oriented utilities of accepting or rejecting a hypothesis
(cf. Wilholt 2013). The VNT, and the idea of scientific objectivity as value
freedom, could then be saved for the case of individual scientific reasoning.
Both defenses of the VNT focus on the impact of values in theory choice,
either by denying that scientists actually choose theories (Jeffrey), or by
referring to community standards (Levi). Douglas (2000: 563–565) points
out, however, that the ‘acceptance’ of scientific theories is only one of several
places for values to enter scientific reasoning, albeit an especially prominent
and explicit one. Many decisions in the process of scientific inquiry may
conceal implicit value judgments: the design of an experiment, the method-
ology for conducting it, the characterization of the data, the choice of a
statistical method for processing and analyzing data, the interpretational
process findings, etc. None of these methodological decisions could be made
without consideration of the possible consequences that could occur. Dou-
glas gives, as a case study, a series of experiments where carcinogenic effects
of dioxine exposure on rats were probed. Contextual values such as safety
and risk aversion affected the conducted research at various stages: first, in
the classification of pathological samples as benign or cancerous (over which
a lot of expert disagreement occurred), second, in the extrapolation from the
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high-dose experimental conditions to the more realistic low-dose conditions.
In both cases, the choice of a conservative classification or model had to be
weighed against the adverse consequences for society that could result from
underestimating the risks.
These diagnoses cast a gloomy light on attempts to divide scientific la-
bor between gathering evidence and determining the degree of confirmation
(value-free) and accepting scientific theories (value-laden). The entire pro-
cess of conceptualizing, gathering and interpreting evidence is so entangled
with contextual values that no neat division, as Jeffrey envisions, will work
outside the narrow realm of statistical inference (cf. Biddle 2013)—and even
there, doubts may be raised (see Section 4.2).
Philip Kitcher (2011a: 31–40) gives an alternative argument, based on
his idea of ‘significant truths’. According to Kitcher, even staunch scientific
realists will not hold that science aims at truth as a goal in itself. There
are simply too many truths that are of no interest whatsover—consider all
the truths about the areas of triangles whose vertices are three arbitrarily
chosen objects (106). Science, then, doesn’t aim at truth simpliciter but
rather at something more narrow: truth worth pursuing from the point of
view of our cognitive, practical and social goals. Any truth that is worth
pursing in this sense is what he calls a ‘significant truth’. Clearly, it is value
judgments that help us decide whether or not any given truth is significant.
What Kitcher argues so far is consistent with the traditional view accord-
ing to which values enter mainly at the first stage of scientific investigation,
problem selection. But then he goes on to observe that the process of scien-
tific investigation cannot neatly be divided into a stage in which the research
question is chosen, one in which the evidence is gathered and one in which
a judgment about the question is made on the basis of the evidence.
Rather, the sequence is multiply iterated. At each stage, the researcher
has to decide whether previous results warrant further investigation in the
same line of research or whether it would be more fruitful to switch to
another avenue, even if the overall goal remains constant. These choices are
laden with contextual values.
To add some precision to this idea, Kitcher distinguishes three schemes
of values: a broad scheme, a cognitive scheme and a probative scheme. The
broad scheme of values is the set of commitments around which someone’s
life is organised, including personal ideals and goals and those people have for
the societies they live in. The cognitive scheme of values concerns the kinds
of knowledge a person values, for their own sake or for the sake of their
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practical consequences. The probative scheme of values, lastly, concerns
more specific questions a researcher finds worth pursuing.
Kitcher now argues that the three schemes mutually interact. Thus, the
cognitive scheme might change in response to pressures from the probative
and the broad scheme. We give an example of our own. Assume that the
cognitive scheme endorses predictive success as an important goal of science.
However, the probative scheme finds no available or conceivable strategy to
reach this goal in some domain of science, for instance because that domain
is characterized by strong non-linear dependencies. In this case, predictive
success might have to yield to other forms of scientific knowledge. After all,
we would be irrational if we continued to pursue a goal that is unattainable
in principle. Conversely, changes in the broad scheme will often necessitate
adjustments in the cognitive and probative schemes: changing social goals
lead to revaluations of scientific knowledge and research methods.
Science, then, cannot be value-free because no scientist ever works ex-
clusively in the supposedly value-free zone of assessing and accepting hy-
potheses. Evidence is gathered and hypotheses are assessed and accepted
in the light of their potential for application and fruitful research avenues.
Both epistemic and contextual value judgments guide these choices and are
themselves influenced by their results. More than that, to portray science
as value-free enterprise carries a danger with it (2011: 40):
The deepest source of the current erosion of scientific authority
consists in insisting on the value-freedom of Genuine Science. . .
3.3 Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal
While the previous discussion focused on the VNT, and the practical at-
tainability of the VFI, little has been said about whether value freedom is
desirable in the first place. This subsection discusses this topic with special
attention to informing and advising public policy from a scientific perspec-
tive. While the VFI, and many arguments for and against it, can be applied
to science as a whole, the interface of science and public policy is the place
where the intrusion of values into science is especially salient, and where it
is surrounded by the greatest controversy. Quite recently, the reproach that
climate scientists were pursuing a particular socio-political agenda (the ‘Cli-
mategate’ affair) did much to damage the authority of science in the public
arena.
Indeed, many debates at the interface of science and public policy are
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characterized by disagreements on propositions that combine a factual basis
with specific goals and values. Take, for instance, the view that growing
transgenic crops carries too much risk in terms of biosecurity, or that global
warming needs to be addressed by cutting CO2 emission. The critical ques-
tion in such debates is whether there are theses T such that one side in the
debate endorses T , the other side rejects it, the evidence is shared, and both
sides have good reasons for their respective positions.
According to the VFI, scientists should uncover an epistemic, value-free
basis for resolving such disagreements and restrict the dissent to the realm
of value judgments. Even if the VNT should turn out to be untenable, and a
strict separation to be impossible, the VFI may have an important function
for guiding scientific research and for minimizing the impact of values on an
objective science. In the philosophy of science, one camp of scholars defends
the VFI as a necessary antidote to individual and institutional interests,
like Hugh Lacey (1999, 2002), Ernan McMullin (1982) and Sandra Mitchell
(2004), while others adopt a critical attitude, like Helen Longino (1990,
1996), Philip Kitcher (2011a) or Heather Douglas (2009). These criticisms
may refer to the desirability, attainability or the conceptual (un)clarity of
the VFI. We begin, however, with the defenders of the VFI.
Lacey distinguishes three components or interpretations of the VFI: im-
partiality, neutrality and autonomy. Impartiality implies that theories are
solely accepted or appraised in virtue of their contribution to the epistemic
values of science, such as truth, accuracy or explanatory power. In partic-
ular, the choice of theories is not influenced by contextual values. Neu-
trality means that scientific theories make no value statements about the
world: they are concerned with what there is, not with what there should
be. Finally, scientific autonomy means that the scientific agenda is shaped
by the desire to increase scientific knowledge, and that contextual values
have no place in scientific method.
These three interpretations of the VFI can be combined with each other,
or stand individually. All of them, however, are subject to severe criticism.
First, on the descriptive level, it is clear that autonomy of science often fails
in practice due to the presence of external interests, e.g., funding agencies
and industry lobbies. Neutrality is questionable in the light of the implicit
role of values in social science, e.g., in Rational Choice Theory (see Section
5.2). Impartiality has been criticized in the above discussion of the VNT.
In addition, it has been argued that the VFI is not desirable at all.
Feminist philosophers (e.g., Harding 1991; Okruhlik 1994; Lloyd 2005) have
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argued that science often carries a heavy androcentric values, for instance
in biological theories about sex, gender and rape. The charge against these
values is not so much that they are contextual rather than epistemic, but
that they are unjustified. The explicit consideration of feminist values may
act as a helpful antidote, in stark contrast with the VFI. Moreover, if scien-
tists did follow the VFI rigidly, policy-makers would pay even less attention
to them, with a detrimental effect on the decisions they take (Cranor 1993).
Given these shortcomings, the VFI has to be rethought if it is supposed to
play a useful role for guiding scientific research and leading to better policy
decisions.
Douglas (2009: 7-8) proposes that the epistemic authority of science can
be detached from its autonomy by distinguishing between direct and indi-
rect roles for values in science. The assessment of evidence may legiti-
mately be affected indirectly by contextual values: they may determine how
we interpret noisy datasets, what is the appropriate standard of evidence
for a specific claim, how the severity of consequences of a decision must be
assessed, and so on. This concerns, above all, policy-related disciplines such
as climate science or economics that routinely perform scientific risk anal-
yses for real-world problems (cf. also Shrader-Frechette 1991). What must
not happen, however, is that contextual values trump scientific evidence, or
are used as a reason to ignore evidence:
cognitive, ethical and social values all have legitimate, indirect
roles to play in the doing of science [. . . ]. When these values
play a direct role in the heart of science, problems arise as un-
acceptable reasoning occurs and the reason for valuing science is
undermined. (Douglas 2009: 108)
Douglas’s conception of objectivity emphasizes a prohibition for values to
replace or dismiss scientific evidence—she calls this detached objectiv-
ity—but it is complemented by various other aspects that relate to a re-
flective balancing of various perspectives and the procedural, social aspects
of science (ch. 6). Instead of subscribing to the traditional VFI, Douglas
suggests to rescue scientific integrity and objectivity by ‘keeping values to
their proper roles’ (175).
That said, Douglas’ proposal is not very concrete when it comes to the
implementation level, e.g. regarding the way diverse values should be bal-
anced. Compromising in the middle cannot be the solution (Weber 1917/88).
First, no standpoint is, just in virtue of being a middle position, evidentially
supported vis-a`-vis more extreme positions. Second, these middle positions
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are also, from a practical point of view, the least functional when it comes
to advising policy-makers.
Moreover, the distinction between direct and indirect roles of values in
science may not be sufficiently clear-cut to police the legitimate use of values
in science. Douglas (2009, 96) distinguishes between values as ‘reasons in
themselves’, that is, treating them as evidence or defeaters for evidence
(direct role, illegitimate) and as ‘helping to decide what should count as a
sufficient reason for a choice’ (indirect role, legitimate). But can we always
draw a neat borderline? Assume that a scientist considers, for whatever
reason, the consequences of erroneously accepting hypothesis H undesirable.
Therefore he uses a statistical model whose results are likely to favor ¬H over
H. Is this a matter of reasonable conservativeness? Or doesn’t it amount to
reasoning to a foregone conclusion, and to treating values as evidence (cf.
Elliott 2011, 320–321)?
The most recent literature on values and evidence in science presents
us with a broad spectrum of opinions. Steele (2012) bolsters Douglas’s
approach by arguing that various probabilistic assessments of uncertainty,
e.g., imprecise probability, involve contextual value judgments as well. Betz
(2013) argues, by contrast, that scientists can largely avoid making contex-
tual value judgments if they carefully express the uncertainty involved with
their evidential judgments, e.g., by using a scale ranging from purely qualita-
tive evidence (such as expert judgment) to precise probabilistic assessments.
The issue of value judgments at earlier stages of inquiry is not addressed by
this proposal; however, disentangling evidential judgments and judgments
involving contextual values at the stage of theory assessment may be a good
thing in itself.
Thus, should we or should we not worried about values in scientific rea-
soning? While Douglas and others make a convincing case that the interplay
of values and evidential considerations need not be pernicious, it is unclear
why it adds to the success or the authority of science. After all, the values
of an individual scientist who makes a risk assessment, need not agree with
those of society. How are we going to ensure that the permissive attitude
towards values in setting evidential standards etc. is not abused? In the ab-
sence of a general theory about which contextual values are beneficial and
which are pernicious, can’t we defend the VFI as a first-order approxima-
tion to a sound, transparent and objective science? Science seems to require
some independence from contextual values in order to maintain its epistemic
authority.
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3.4 Feyerabend: The Tyranny of the Rational Method
The last part of the section on science and values deals with Paul Feyer-
abend’s radical assault on the rationality and objectivity of scientific method
(see also http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend/). His position is ex-
ceptional in the philosophical literature since traditionally, the threat for
objectivity is located in contextual rather than epistemic values. Feyer-
abend turns this view upside down: it is the ‘tyranny’ of rational method,
and the emphasis on epistemic rather than contextual values that prevents
us from having a science in the service of society. Thus, Feyerabend vocif-
erously denies the VFI and also the VNT by his claim that Western science
is loaded with all kinds of pernicious values.
Feyerabend’s writings on objectivity and values in science have an epis-
temic as well as a political dimension. Regarding the first, the leading
philosophy of science figures in Feyerabend’s young days such as Carnap,
Hempel and Popper characterized scientific method in terms of rules for
rational scientific reasoning. Some of them, like Popper, devoted special at-
tention to the demarcation of science from ‘pseudo-science’ and imposture,
thereby derogating other traditions as irrational or, in any case, inferior.
Feyerabend thinks, however, that science must be protected from a ‘rule of
rationality’, identified with strict adherence to scientific method: such rules
only suppress an open exchange of ideas, extinguish scientific creativity and
prevent a free and truly democratic science.
In his classic ‘Against Method’ (1975, chs. 8-13), Feyerabend elaborates
this criticism from a famous episode in the history of science: the devel-
opment of Galilean mechanics and the discovery of the Jupiter moons. In
superficial treatments of this episode, it is stressed that an obscurantist and
value-driven Catholic Church forced Galilei to recant from a scientifically
superior position backed by value-free, objective findings. But in fact, Fey-
erabend argues, the Church had the better arguments by the standards of
17th century science. Their conservatism regarding their Weltanschauung
was scientifically backed: Galilei’s telescopes were unreliable for celestial
observations, and many well-established phenomena (no fixed star parallax,
invariance of laws of motion) could at first not be explained in the helio-
centric system. Hence, scientific method was not on Galilei’s side, but on
the side of the Church who gave preference to the old, Ptolemaic world-
view. With hindsight, Galilei managed to achieve groundbreaking scientific
progress just because he deliberately violated rules of scientific reasoning,
because he stubbornly sticked to a problematic approach until decisive theo-
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retical and technological innovations were made. Hence Feyerabend’s dictum
‘Anything goes’: no methodology whatsoever is able to capture the creative
and often irrational ways by which science deepens our understanding of the
world.
The drawbacks of an objective, value-free and method-bound view on
science and scientific method are not only epistemic. Such a view narrows
down our perspective and makes us less free, open-minded, creative, and
ultimately, less human in our thinking (1975: 154). It is therefore neither
possible nor desirable to have an objective, value-free science (cf. 1978: 78–
79). As a consequence, Feyerabend sees traditional forms of inquiry about
our world (e.g., Chinese medicine) on a par with their Western competitors.
He denounces appeal to objective standards as a reason for preferring one’s
own worldview:
there is hardly any difference between the members of a ‘prim-
itive’ tribe who defend their laws because they are the laws of
the gods [. . . ] and a rationalist who appeals to ‘objective’ stan-
dards, except that the former know what they are doing while
the latter does not’ (1978: 82)
In other words, the defenders of scientific method abuse the word ‘objective’
for proving the superiority of Western science vis-a`-vis other worldviews.
To this, Feyerabend adds that when dismissing other traditions, we actually
project our own worldview, and our own value judgments, into them instead
of making an impartial comparison (1978: 80–83). There is no purely ra-
tional justification for dismissing other perspectives in favor of the Western
scientific worldview. To illustrate his point, Feyerabend compares the de-
fenders of a strong, value-free notion of objectivity to scientists who stick to
the concepts of absolute length and time in spite of the Theory of Relativity.
A staunch defense of objectivity and value freedom may just expose our own
narrow-mindedness. This is not meant to say that truth loses its function
as a normative concept in science, nor that all scientific claims are equally
acceptable. Rather, Feyerabend demands that we move toward a genuine
epistemic pluralism that accepts diverse approaches to searching an ac-
quiring knowledge. In such an epistemic pluralism, science may regain its
objectivity in the sense of respecting the diversity of values and traditions
that drive our inquiries about the world (1978: 106–107).
All this has a political aspect, too. In the times of the scientific revo-
lution or the Enlightenment, science acted as a liberating force that fought
intellectual and political oppression by the sovereign, the nobility or the
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clergy. Nowadays, Feyerabend continues, the ideals of value-freedom and
objectivity are often abused for excluding non-experts from science, proving
the superiority of the Western way of life, and undergirding the power of an
intellectual elite. (Here it is important to keep in mind that Feyerabend’s
writings on this issue date mostly from the 1970s and were much influenced
by the Civil Rights Movement in the US and the increasing emancipation
of minorities, such as Blacks, Asians and Hispanics.) Feyerabend therefore
argues that democratic societies need to exert much greater control over
scientific research. Laymen have to supervise science. This includes areas
where even defenders of the VFI refrain from demanding value freedom,
such as setting up a research agenda, distributing funds, and supervising
scientific inquiry. But it also concerns areas that are more central to the
VFI, such as the choice of a research method or the assessment of scientific
theories. Contrary to commonly held beliefs, lack of specialized training
need not imply lack of relevant knowledge (1975: xiii). Feyerabends sums
up his view as follows:
a community will use science and scientists in a way that agrees
with its values and aims and it will correct the scientific insti-
tutions in its midst to bring them closer to these aims (1975:
251)
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4 Objectivity as Freedom from Personal Biases
This section deals with scientific objectivity as a form of intersubjectivity—
as freedom from personal biases. According to this view, science is objective
to the extent that personal biases are absent from scientific reasoning, or that
they can be eliminated in a social process. Perhaps all science is necessarily
perspectival. Perhaps we cannot sensibly draw scientific inferences without
a host of background assumptions, which may include assumptions about
values. But scientific results should certainly not depend on researchers’ per-
sonal preferences or idiosyncratic experiences. That, among other things,
is what distinguishes science from the arts and other more individualistic
human activities—or so it is said. A paradigmatic way to achieve objectivity
in this sense are measurement and quantification. What has been measured
and quantified has been verified relative to a standard. The truth, say, that
the Eiffel Tower is 324 meters tall is relative to a standard unit and con-
ventions about how to use certain instruments, so it is neither aperspectival
nor free from assumptions, but it is independent from the person making
the measurement.
We will begin with a discussion of objectivity, so conceived, in measure-
ment, discuss the ideal of ‘mechanical objectivity’ and then investigate to
what extent freedom from personal biases can be implemented in statistical
and inductive inference—arguably the core of scientific reasoning, especially
in experimentally working sciences.
4.1 Measurement and Quantification
Measurement is often thought to epitomize scientific objectivity, most fa-
mously captured in Lord Kelvin’s dictum ‘when you cannot express it in
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may
be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts,
advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be’.
Measurement can certainly achieve some independence of perspective.
Yesterday’s weather in Durham UK may have been ‘really hot’ to the aver-
age North Eastern Brit and ‘very cold’ to the average Mexican, but they’ll
both accept that it was 21◦ C. Clearly, however, measurement does not re-
sult in a ‘view from nowhere’, nor are typical measurement results free from
presuppositions. Measurement instruments interact with the environment,
and so results will always be a product of both the properties of the en-
vironment we aim to measure as well as the properties of the instrument.
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Instruments, thus, provide a perspectival view on the world (cf. Giere 2006).
Moreover, making sense of measurement results requires interpretation.
Consider temperature measurement. Thermometers function by relating an
unobservable quantity, temperature, to an observable quantity, expansion
(or length) of a fluid or gas in a glass tube; that is, thermometers measure
temperature by assuming that length is a function of temperature: length
= f(temperature). The function f is not known a priori, and it cannot be
tested either (because it could in principle only be tested using a veridical
thermometer, and the veridicality of the thermometer is just what is at
stake here). Making a specific assumption, for instance that f is linear,
solves that problem by fiat. But this ‘solution’ does not take us very far
because different thermometric substances (e.g., mercury, air or water) yield
different results for the points intermediate between the two fixed points 0◦C
and 100◦C, and so they can’t all expand linearly.
In Hasok Chang’s account of early thermometry (Chang 2004), the prob-
lem was eventually solved by using a ‘principle of minimalist overdetermi-
nation’, whose goal it was to find a reliable thermometer while making as
few substantial assumptions (e.g., about the form for f) as possible. It was
argued, eventually, that if a thermometer was to be reliable, different to-
kens of the same thermometer type should agree with each other, and the
results of air thermometers agreed the most. ‘Minimal’ doesn’t mean zero,
however, and indeed this procedure makes an important presupposition (in
this case a metaphysical assumption about the one-valuedness of a physical
quantity). Moreover, the procedure yielded at best a reliable instrument,
not necessarily one that was best at tracking the uniquely real temperature
(if there is such a thing).
What Chang argues about early thermometry is true of measurement
more generally. Measurements are always made against a backdrop of meta-
physical presuppositions, theoretical expectations and other kinds of belief.
Whether or not any given procedure is regarded as adequate depends to a
large extent on the purposes pursued by the individual scientist or group
of scientists making the measurements. Especially in the social sciences,
this often means that measurement procedures are laden with normative
assumptions, i.e., values.
Julian Reiss (2008, 2013) has argued that economic indicators such as
consumer price inflation, gross domestic product and the unemployment rate
are value-laden in this sense. Consumer-price indices, for instance, assume
that if a consumer prefers a bundle x over an alternative y, then x is better
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for her than y, which is as ethically charged as it is controversial. National
income measures assume that nations that exchange a larger share of goods
and services on markets are richer than nations where the same goods and
services are provided by the government, which is as ethically charged and
controversial.
While not free of assumptions and values, the goal of many measure-
ment procedures remains to reduce the influence of personal biases and id-
iosyncrasies. The Nixon administration, famously, indexed social security
payments to the consumer-price index in order to eliminate the dependence
of security recipients on the flimsies of party politics: to make increases au-
tomatic instead of a result of political negotiations (Nixon 1969). Lorraine
Daston and Peter Galison refer to this as mechanical objectivity. They
write:
Finally, we come to the full-fledged establishment of mechanical
objectivity as the ideal of scientific representation. What we find
is that the image, as standard bearer of is objectivity is tied to a
relentless search to replace individual volition and discretion in
depiction by the invariable routines of mechanical reproduction.
(Daston and Galison 1992: 98)
The artist Salvador Dal´ı, no doubt unwittingly, describes his surrealist
paintings as a product of mechanical objectivity in Daston and Galison’s
sense:
In truth I am no more than an automaton that registers, without
judgment and as exactly as possible, the dictate of my subcon-
scious: my dreams, hypnagogic images and visions, and all the
concrete and irrational manifestations of the dark and sensa-
tional world discovered by Freud. (Dal´ı 1935)
Mechanical objectivity reduces the importance of human contributions
to scientific results to a minimum, and therefore enables science to proceed
on a large scale where bonds of trust between individuals can no longer
hold (Daston 1992). Trust in mechanical procedures thus replaces trust in
individual scientists.
In his book Trust in Numbers, Theodore Porter pursues this line of
thought in great detail. In particular, on the basis of case studies involv-
ing British actuaries in the mid-nineteenth century, of French state engineers
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throughout the century, and of the US Army Corps of Engineers from 1920 to
1960, he argues for two causal claims. First, measurement instruments and
quantitative procedures originate in commercial and administrative needs
and affect the ways in which the natural and social sciences are practiced, not
the other way around. The mushrooming of instruments such as chemical
balances, barometers, chronometers was largely a result of social pressures
and the demands of democratic societies. Administering large territories or
controlling diverse people and processes is not always possible on the basis
of personal trust and thus ‘objective procedures’ (which do not require trust
in persons) took the place of ‘subjective judgments’ (which do). Second, he
argues that quantification is a technology of distrust and weakness, and not
of strength. It is weak administrators who do not have the social status, po-
litical support or professional solidarity to defend their experts’ judgments.
They therefore subject decisions to public scrutiny, which means that they
must be made in a publicly accessible form.
This is the situation in which scientists who work in areas where the
science/policy boundary is fluid find themselves:
The National Academy of Sciences has accepted the principle
that scientists should declare their conflicts of interest and finan-
cial holdings before offering policy advice, or even information
to the government. And while police inspections of notebooks
remain exceptional, the personal and financial interests of scien-
tists and engineers are often considered material, especially in
legal and regulatory contexts.
Strategies of impersonality must be understood partly as de-
fenses against such suspicions [. . . ]. Objectivity means knowl-
edge that does not depend too much on the particular individuals
who author it. (Porter 1995: 229)
Measurement and quantification help to reduce the influence of personal
biases and idiosyncrasies and they reduce the need to trust the scientist or
government offical, but often at a cost. Standardizing scientific procedures
becomes difficult when their subject matters are not homogenous, and few
domains outside fundamental physics are. Attempts to quantify procedures
for treatment and policy decisions that we find in evidence-based practices
are currently transferred to a variety of sciences such as medicine, nursing,
psychology, education and social policy. However, they often lack a certain
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degree of responsiveness to the peculiarities of their subjects and the local
conditions to which they are applied (see also section 5.3).
Moreover, the measurement and quantification of characteristics of sci-
entific interest is only half of the story. We also want to describe relations
between the quantities and make inferences using statistical analysis. Statis-
tics thus helps to quantify further aspects of scientific work. We will now
turn to the question whether or not statistical analysis can proceed in a way
free from personal biases and idiosyncrasies.
4.2 Inductive and Statistical Inference
The appraisal of scientific evidence is traditionally regarded as a domain of
scientific reasoning where the ideal of scientific objectivity has strong nor-
mative force, and where it is also well-implemented into scientific practice.
Episodes such as Galilei’s observations of the Jupiter moons, Lavoisier’s cal-
cination experiments, and Eddington’s observation of the 1919 eclipse are
found in all philosophy of science textbooks because they exemplify how
evidence can be persuasive and compelling to scientists with different back-
grounds. The crucial question is therofore: can we identify an ‘objective’
concept of scientific evidence that is independent of the personal biases of
the experimenter and interpreter?
Inferential statistics—the field that investigates the validity of inferences
from data to theory—tries to answer this question. It is extremely influen-
tial in modern science. For instance, the recent discovery of the Higgs Bo-
son was established through a statistical argument, based on the idea that
what is ‘significant’ for one researcher should also be significant for another.
Therefore, this subsection contrasts several schools of inductive/statistical
inference and compares them with respect to their objectivity claims.
Logical Probability and Bayesian Inference
In Section 3.2, we have encountered the idea of a scientist who assesses the
probability of a hypothesis in the light of the evidence—a conception based
on Rudolf Carnap’s monumental work ‘Logical Foundations of Probability’
(1950/62). Carnap is interested in determining the degree of confirma-
tion of a hypothesis relative to a given set of observations. To adequately
explicate this concept, Carnap first investigates a clear-cut, simple setting:
a logical first-order language L with finitely many monadic predicates and
infinitely many individual constants. Carnap then considers all maximally
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specific descriptions of states of the world in L and assigns a measure m over
these descriptions. Subsequently, the available observations E are conceptu-
alized as a conjunction of L-statements. Finally, the degree of confirmation






In other words, the degree of confirmation of hypothesis H relative to E is
the conditional probability of H given E. But is this probability an objective
quantity and free from personal bias?
The answer to this question stands and falls with the choice of the m-
function. Not all are equally suited: for example, assigning equal weight to
all complete state descriptions would not allow for learning from experience.
Carnap himself admits that no conclusive argument for a specific m can be
made. In later work, he therefore parametrized the choice of a m-function by
a parameter λ that expressed the respective impact of logical and empirical
considerations on prediction.
Carnap’s probabilty logic has often been described as an ‘inductive ma-
chinery’. We now see where these comments miss the point: they neglect the
subjective choices on which the inductive inferences are built. Carnap’s ap-
proach is objective in so far as the degree of confirmation is intersubjectively
compelling once a logical language and appropriate symmetry principles for
this language are agreed upon; however, it is subjective in the sense that
rational agents may disagree on these principles.
Closely related to Carnap’s logical probability framework is the Bayesian
approach to confirmation and evidence, developed first by Frank Ramsey.
It is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist’s
subjective degrees of belief in a particular hypothesis. These degrees
of belief are changed by conditionalization on observed evidence E and
making use of Bayes’ Theorem:
pnew(H) := p(H|E) = p(H)p(E|H)
p(E)
(2)
The credibility of a hypothesis H in the face of evidence E is then judged by
its conditional probability p(H|E), commonly called the posterior (prob-
ability) of H, as opposed to the prior (probability) p(H). These days,
the Bayesian approach is extremely influential in philosophy, but also in
scientific disciplines such as statistics, economics, and biology. The differ-
ence to Carnap lies in the philosophical motivation, and in the different
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understanding of confirmation judgments: for Carnap, they are primarily a
consequence of certain logical ways of carving the world at its joints; for the
Bayesian, they express a genuinely subjective uncertainty judgment. See
also http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/.
Can we ground the objectivity of scientific evidence in a framework that
is explicitly based on personal attitudes? Some authors have argued that
measuring ‘mere psychological tendencies’ (Fisher 1935: 6–7) such as degrees
of belief cannot be relevant for scientific inquiry. Bayesians have supplied
several arguments to the effect that subjective probability is not equal to
personal bias, which we will review in turn.
1. As argued by Howson (2003) and Howson and Urbach (1993), the
Bayesian’s aim is not to determine an intersubjectively binding degree
of confirmation, but to provide sound inference rules for learning from
experience. In the same way that deductive logic does not judge the
correctness of the premises but just advises you what to infer from
them, Bayesian inductive logic tells you how to change your own
attitudes as soon as you encounter evidence. All other updating rules
are susceptible to so-called Dutch books: betting based on following
such rules will lead to sure monetary losses. In addition, convergence
theorems guarantee that, as long as novel evidence keeps coming in,
the degrees of belief of agents with very different initial attitudes will
finally converge (Gaifman and Snir 1982).
Reply: This argument answers a different question. The worry is not about
the soundness of the updating process from a prior to a posterior
probability. Rather, since any posterior probability can be justified by
choosing an appropriate prior, the resulting posterior may still be beset
with idiosyncratic bias and manifest social values. The convergence
theorems provide no relief since they hold in the limit only, and do not
indicate at which point our judgment is free from personal bias.
2. Modern Bayesians distinguish between the absolute and incremen-
tal concept of confirmation. The absolute concept of confirmation
measures the credibility of a hypothesis H in the light of evidence E,
and it is proportional to the prior of H (see equation (2)). The incre-
mental concept, however, measures the impact of E on H, in terms of
the strength of belief change. Several philosophers have argued that
there is just one incremental measure of confirmation that satisfies a
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set of generally accepted desirable constraints (e.g., Good 1950; Ke-
meny and Oppenheim 1952; Crupi, Tentori and Gonzalez 2007). If
one of these arguments were sound, then the incremental degree of
confirmation would provide a bias-free assessment of the evidence.
Reply: This approach is promising, but to date, none of the ‘uniqueness theo-
rems’ for a specific measure of confirmation has gained general accep-
tance. On the other hand, Bayesian statisticians almost uniformly use
the Bayes factor, that is, the ratio of prior to posterior odds in favor
of a hypothesis. In the case of two parametric hypotheses H0 : θ ∈ Θ0











The Bayes factor has a number of desirable properties in inference and
model selection (Kass and Raftery 1995), and it also corresponds to a
particularly popular confirmation measure, the log-likelihood measure
l. Although not free from subjective assumptions, the Bayes factor
may be our best candidate for a bias-free assessment of the evidence.
3. The Bayesian approach can eliminate personal bias by imposing addi-
tional constraints on an agent’s rational degrees of belief. One way to
do so consists in adopting the Principle of Maximum Entropy or
MaxEnt, going back to Jaynes (1968) and developed philosophically by
Jon Williamson (2010). Williamson retains the demand that degrees
of belief satisfy the probability axioms, but dismisses the updating
by conditionalization in equation (2). Instead, he demands that the
agent’s degrees of belief must be in sync with empirical constraints
and that, conditional on these constraints, they must be equivocal,
that is, as middling as possible. This latter constraint amounts to
maximizing the entropy of the probability distribution in question. If





p(ω) log p(ω). (4)
Since maximizing the right hand side in (4) leads to a unique solution,
subjective bias is eliminated. Instead of going for MaxEnt, one could
also assume objective priors, that is, prior probabilities which do not
represent an agent’s factual attitudes, but are determined by principles
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of symmetry, mathematical convenience or maximizing the influence
of the data on the posterior (e.g, Jeffreys 1939/80; Bernardo 2012).
Reply: In general, the achievements of the various objective Bayesian ap-
proaches come at the expense of weakening their philosophical founda-
tions. For example, the viability of Williamson’s approach depends on
the persuasiveness of his arguments in favor of the equivocation norm,
which fall, as of today, short of convincing a skeptic (cf. Williamson
2010, ch. 3). Similarly, arguments for objective priors depend on par-
ticular ways of conceptualizing inference problems. On the other hand,
these objections may be outweighed by the substantial practical ben-
efits of objective Bayesian inference (Sprenger 2012).
Thus, Bayesianism provides not more than a partial answer to securing
scientific objectivity from personal idiosyncrasy. On the other hand, the
objections to the above proposals are no K.O.-arguments, and further de-
velopments of the discussed approaches may help to reconcile transparency
about subjective assumptions with objectivity in interpreting statistical ev-
idence.
That said, one may argue that the theories we discussed so far all miss
the target. Bayesians primarily address the question of which theories we
should rationally believe in. The decision procedures reviewed in Section
3.2 respond to the question of what we should do. Both analyze the concept
of statistical evidence from the vantage point of their primary focus—
beliefs and decisions. But can’t we quantify the support for or against a
hypothesis in an intersubjectively compelling way, without buying into a
subjectivist or a behavioral framework? This is the ambition of frequentist
and likelihood-based explications of scientific evidence.
Frequentist Inference
The frequentist conception of evidence is based on the idea of the statistical
test of a hypothesis. Under the influence of the statisticians Neyman and
Pearson, tests were often regarded as rational decision procedures that
minimize the relative frequency of wrong decisions in a hypothetical series
of repetitions of a test. As we have seen in Section 3.2., the choice of thresh-
olds in such tests may reflect contextual value judgments and personal bias.
Moreover, the losses associated with erroneously accepting or rejecting that
hypothesis depend on the context of application which may be unbeknownst
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to the experimenter. This speaks for a division of labor where scientists re-
strict themselves to an evidential interpretation of statistical tests,
and leave the actual decisions to policy-makers and regulatory agencies.
Such an approach has been developed by Ronald A. Fisher’s (1890–
1962) and has become the orthodox solution to statistical inference prob-
lems. Fisher reasons that if an observed result is ‘extreme’, then it provides
evidence against that hypothesis. In other words, if a result has lower prob-
ability under the null hypothesis H than most other possible results, then it
undermines the tenability of H:
either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred, or the theory
[=the null hypothesis] is not true. (Fisher 1956: 39)
Then, the strength of evidence against the tested hypothesis is equal to the
p-value—the probability of obtaining a result that is as least as extreme
as the actually observed data. Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration. This
probability measures how strongly E speaks against H, compared to other
possible results, and the lower it is, the stronger the evidence against H.
Fisher interpreted the p-value as ‘a measure of the rational grounds for the
disbelief [in the null hypothesis] it augments’ (Fisher 1956, 43). Conven-
tionally, a p-value smaller than .05 is classified as ‘significant evidence’, a
p-value smaller than .01 is called ‘very significant evidence’, etc. This basic
idea is also underlying Mayo’s (1996) error-statistical theory of evidence,
although she focus on the ‘severity’ of a test (that is, the observed power).
This concept of evidence is apparently objective, but beset with a va-
riety of problems (see Sprenger 2014 for a detailed discussion). From a
practical point of view, it turns out that most researchers have problems
to correctly interpret p-values. For instance, the p-value is often re-
garded as a posterior probability of the tested hypothesis (Oakes 1986), or
its significance vis-a`-vis effect size is exaggerated, although the latter is of-
ten the scientifically more interesting quantity (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008).
Personal bias enters statistical inference by means of widespread interpreta-
tional mistakes. Moreover, the conventional use of the famous 5% threshold
for statistical significance is clearly arbitrary and anything but objective.
There is no intersubjectively compelling justification why this particular
standard of evidence should be used. As statisticians put it, ‘God loves the
.06 [i.e., a 6% threshold] nearly as much as the .05’ (Rosnow and Rosenthal
1989).
From an institutional point of view, the frequentist conception of p-values
is problematic as well. Not only does the automatic use of conventional sig-
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Figure 1: The p-value, represented as the shaded area under the probability density of
the tested hypothesis X ∼ N(0, 1), for observed data x = 1.8 (p = 0.072).
nificance levels imply that much valuable research is suppressed, because
‘insignificant’ results have no chance of publication. Ioannidis (2005) even
claims that most published research findings are false. Indeed, re-
searchers often fail to replicate findings by another scientific team, and pe-
riods of excitement and subsequent disappointment are not uncommon in
frontier science. Why is this the case? Ioannidis reasons that there are
many false causal claims that may be erroneously supported and yield a
publishable research finding. The probability that this happens by accident
is plausibly larger than the probability that we detect one of the relatively
rare true causal relations. This is not only a feature of scientific inquiry in
general, but specifically due to the frequentist logic of evidence: the one-
time achievement of a significant result provides evidence in the frequentist
sense, but it is not a very good indicator for the tenability of a hypothesis.
Finally, there is a principled philosophical objection against the objec-
tivity of frequentist evidence: the sample space dependence. That is, in
frequentist statistics, the strength of the evidence depends on which results
could have been observed (but were not observed). For instance, the post-
experimental assessment of the evidence has to be changed when we learn
about a defect in our measurement instrument, even if that defect is not rel-
evant for the range of the actually observed results! On a Bayesian reading,
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this implies that frequentist evidence statements depend on the intentions
of the experimenter (Edwards, Lindman and Savage 1963; Sprenger 2009):
Would she have continued the trial if the results had been different? How
would she have reacted to unforeseen circumstances? This feature of fre-
quentist inference jeopardizes claims that frequentist evidence is objective
and free from personal bias.
Likelihood-Based Inference
A middle ground between frequentist and Bayesian inference is provided
by likelihoodist inference, based on Alan Turing and I.J. Good’s work on
breaking the Enigma code during World War II. Their research yielded a
theory of evidence where instead of asking to what extent evidence E sup-
ports hypothesis H, it is measured how much E favors H over an alternative
H’ (Good 1950). In this approach, the canonical measure of weight of
evidence w is explicated as
w(E,H,H ′) = log
p(E|H)
p(E|H ′) (5)
A conception of statistical evidence based on w or monotonic transforma-
tions of w is usually called a likelihood-based theory of evidence. This
is because the probabilities of the actual evidence E under the competing
hypotheses are called the likelihoods of H on E.
Whenever H and H ′ imply specific statistical distributions for the ob-
served evidence, this measure can be calculated in an objective, subject-
independent way. Therefore, a minority of statisticians (e.g., Royall 1997)
uses this measure as a fundamental notion of evidence, and philosophers such
as Hacking (1965) and Sober (2008) have applied this concept of evidence
to various issues in formal epistemology, inductive inference and philosophy
of biology.
However, the scope of w is restricted. In routinely testing the values
of the mean or variance of a distribution, H ′ is often a composite hypoth-
esis whose components are indexed by a parameter θ (e.g., H : θ = θ0
is tested against H ′ : θ 6= θ0). A Bayesian would then appeal to subjec-
tive belief attitudes toward the individual hypotheses Hθ, calculate p(E) =∑
θ p(Hθ)p(E|Hθ) and update her beliefs by conditionalization. However,
the likelihoodist cannot use subjective probability in order to transform a
composite hypothesis into a simple one. Therefore, for composite statistical
hypotheses, we either have to compromise the objectivity of w(E,H,H ′) by
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introducing subjective weightings, or we have to weaken the conceptual ar-
guments in favor of w, e.g., by switching to comparing maximum likelihoods
instead of average likelihoods.
Summing up our findings, no statistical theory of evidence manages to
eliminate all sources of personal bias and idiosyncrasy. The Bayesian is hon-
est about it: she considers subjective assumptions to be ineliminable from
scientific reasoning. This does not rule out that constrastive aspects of sta-
tistical evidence may be quantified in an objective way, e.g., by using Bayes
factors. On that point, she agrees with the likelihoodist, who has perhaps
the ‘purest’ model of objective statistical evidence, but also the one with
the most restricted scope. The frequentist conception based on p-values
still dominates statistical practice, but it suffers from several conceptual
drawbacks, and in particular the misleading impression of objectivity. This
also has far-reaching implications for fields such as evidence-based medicine,
where randomized controlled trials (the most valuable source of evidence) are
typically interpreted in a frequentist way. A defense of frequentist inference
should, in our opinion, stress that the relatively rigid rules for interpreting
statistical evidence facilitate communication and assessment of research re-
sults in the scientific community—something that is harder to achieve for a
Bayesian.
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5 Issues in the Special Sciences
So far everything we discussed was meant to apply across all or at least
most of the sciences. In this section we will look at a number of specific
issues that arise in the social science, in economics, and in evidence-based
medicine.
5.1 Max Weber and Objectivity in the Social Sciences
There is a long tradition in the philosophy of social science maintaining that
there is a gulf in terms of both goals as well as methods between the natural
and the social sciences. This tradition, associated with thinkers such as the
neo-Kantians Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, the hermeneuticist
Wilhelm Dilthey, the sociologist-economist Max Weber, and the twentieth-
century hermeneuticists Hans-Georg Gadamer and Michael Oakeshott, holds
that unlike the natural sciences whose aim it is to establish natural laws and
which proceed by experimentation and causal analysis, the social sciences
seek understanding (‘Verstehen’) of social phenomena, the interpretive ex-
amination of the meanings individuals attribute to their actions (Rickert
1929/1986; Windelband 1915; Dilthey 2002; Weber 1904/1949b; Gadamer
1989; Oakeshott 1933).
Understood this way, social science lacks objectivity in more than one
sense. One of the more important debates concerning objectivity in the
social sciences concerns the role value judgments play and, importantly,
whether value-laden research entails claims about the desirability of actions.
Max Weber held that the social sciences are necessarily value laden. How-
ever, they can achieve some degree of objectivity by keeping out the social
researcher’s views about whether agents’ goals are commendable. In a sim-
ilar vein, contemporary economics can be said to be value laden because it
predicts and explains social phenomena on the basis of agents’ preferences.
Nevertheless, economists are adamant that economists are not in the busi-
ness of telling people what they ought to value. Modern economics is thus
said to be objective in the Weberian sense of ‘absence of researchers’
values’—a conception that we discussed in detail in Section 3.
In his widely cited essay ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’
(Weber 1904/1949a), Weber argued that the idea of an aperspectival social
science was meaningless (72/81):
There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of [. . . ] ‘social
phenomena’ independent of special and ‘one-sided’ viewpoints
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according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or uncon-
sciously they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository
purposes.
All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowl-
edge from particular points of view.
The reason for this is twofold. First, reality is too complex to admit
of full description and explanation. So we have to select. But, perhaps in
contraposition to the natural sciences, we cannot just select those aspects of
the phenomena that fall under universal natural laws and treat everything
else as ‘unintegrated residues’ (73). This is because, second, in the social
sciences we want to understand social phenomena in their individuality, that
is, in their unique configurations that have significance for us.
Values solve a selection problem. They tell us what research questions
we ought to address because they inform us about the cultural importance
of social phenomena (76):
Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our
value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is
significant because it reveals relationships which are important
to use due to their connection with our values.
It is important to note that Weber did not think that social and natural
science were different in kind. Social science too examines the causes of
phenomena of interest, and natural science too often seeks to explain natural
phenomena in their individual constellations. The role of causal laws is
different in the two fields, however. Whereas establishing a causal law is
often an end in itself in the natural sciences, in the social sciences laws play
an attenuated and accompanying role as mere means to explain cultural
phenomena in their uniqueness.
Nevertheless, for Weber social science remained objective in at least two
ways. First, once research questions of interest have been settled, answers
about the causes of culturally significant phenomena do not depend on the
idiosyncrasies of an individual researcher (84; emphasis original):
But it obviously does not follow from this that research in the
cultural sciences can only have results which are ‘subjective’ in
the sense that they are valid for one person and not for others.
[. . . ] For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who
seek the truth.
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The claims of social science can therefore be objective in our third sense
(see Section 4). Moreover, by determining that a given phenomenon is ‘cul-
turally significant’ a researcher reflects on whether or not a practice is ‘mean-
ingful’ or ‘important’, and not whether or not it is commendable: ‘Prostitu-
tion is a cultural phenomenon just as much as religion or money’ (81). An
important implication of this view came to the fore in the so-called ‘Wer-
turteilsstreit ’ (quarrel concerning value judgments) of the early 1900’s. In
this debate, Weber maintained against the ‘socialists of the lectern’ around
Gustav Schmoller the position that social scientists qua scientists should not
be directly involved in policy debates because it was not the aim of science to
examine the appropriateness of ends. Given a policy goal, a social scientist
could make recommendations about effective strategies to reach the goal;
but social science was to be value-free in the sense of not taking a stance on
the desirability of the goals themselves. This leads us directly to the second
relevant sense of objectivity.
5.2 Contemporary Rational Choice Theory
Contemporary mainstream economists hold a view concerning objectivity
that mirrors Max Weber’s (see above). On the one hand, it is clear that
value judgments are at the heart of economic theorizing. ‘Preferences’ are
a key concept of rational choice theory, the main theory in contemporary
mainstream economics. Preferences are evaluations. If an individual prefers
A to B, she values A higher than B (Hausman 2012). Thus, to the extent
that economists predict and explain market behavior in terms of rational
choice theory, they predict and explain market behavior in a way laden with
value judgments.
However, economists are not themselves supposed to take a stance about
whether or not whatever individuals value is also ‘objectively’ good in a
stronger sense (Paternotte 2011: 307-8):
[. . . ] that an agent is rational from [rational choice theory]’s
point of view does not mean that the course of action she will
choose is objectively optimal. Desires do not have to align with
any objective measure of ‘goodness’: I may want to risk swim-
ming in a crocodile-infested lake; I may desire to smoke or drink
even though I know it harms me. Optimality is determined by
the agent’s desires, not the converse.
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In a similar vein, Gul and Pesendorfer write (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008:
8):
However, standard economics has no therapeutic ambition, i.e.,
it does not try to evaluate or improve the individual’s objec-
tives. Economics cannot distinguish between choices that max-
imize happiness, choices that reflect a sense of duty, or choices
that are the response to some impulse. Moreover, standard eco-
nomics takes no position on the question of which of those ob-
jectives the agent should pursue.
According to the standard view, all that rational choice theory demands
is that people’s preferences are (internally) consistent; it has no business
in telling people what they ought to prefer, whether their preferences are
consistent with external norms or values. Economics is thus value-laden,
but laden with the values of the agents whose behavior it seeks to predict
and explain and not with the values of those who seek to predict and explain
this behavior.
Whether or not social science, and economics in particular, can be ob-
jective in this—Weber’s and the contemporary economists’—sense is con-
troversial. On the one hand, there are some reasons to believe that rational
choice theory (which is at work not only in economics but also in political
science and other social sciences) cannot be applied to empirical phenomena
without referring to external norms or values (Sen 1993; Reiss 2013).
On the other hand, it is not clear that economists and other social sci-
entists qua social scientists shouldn’t participate in a debate about social
goals. For one thing, trying to do welfare analysis in the standard Webe-
rian way tends to obscure rather than to eliminate normative commitments
(Putnam and Walsh 2007). Obscuring value judgments can be detrimental
to the social scientist as policy advisor because it will hamper rather than
promote trust in social science. For another, economists are in a prime po-
sition to contribute to ethical debates, for a variety of reasons, and should
therefore take this responsibility seriously (Atkinson 2001).
5.3 Evidence-based Medicine and Social Policy
The same demands calling for ‘mechanical objectivity’ in the natural sci-
ences and quantification in the social and policy sciences in the 19th century
and mid-20th century are responsible for a recent movement in biomedical
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research, which, even more recently, have swept to contemporary social sci-
ence and policy. Early proponents of so-called ‘evidence-based medicine’
made their pursuit of a downplay of the ‘human element’ in medicine plain
(Guyatt et al. 1992: 2420):
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic
clinical experience, and pathophysiological rationale as sufficient
grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the examination
of evidence from clinical research.
To call the new movement ‘evidence-based’ is a misnomer strictly speak-
ing, as intuition, clinical experience and pathophysiological rationale can
certainly constitute evidence. But proponents of evidence-based practices
have a much narrower concept of evidence in mind: analyses of the results of
randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This movement is now very strong in
biomedical research, development economics and a number of areas of social
science, especially psychology, education and social policy, especially in the
English speaking world.
The goal is that of replacing subjective (biased, error-prone, idiosyn-
cratic) judgments by mechanically objective methods. But, as in other areas,
attempting to mechanize inquiry can lead to reduced accuracy and utility
of the results.
Causal relations in the social and biomedical sciences hold on account
of highly complex arrangements of factors and conditions. Whether for in-
stance a substance is toxic depends on details of the metabolic system of the
population ingesting it and whether an educational policy is effective on the
constellation of factors within which the policy is to be implemented. If an
RCT was conducted successfully, the conclusion about the effectiveness of
the treatment (or toxicity of a substance) under test is certain for the par-
ticular arrangement of factors and conditions of the trial (Cartwright 2007).
But unlike the RCT itself, many of whose aspects can be (relatively) me-
chanically implemented, applying the result to a new setting (recommending
a treatment to a patient, for instance) always involves subjective judgments
of the kind proponents of evidence-based practices seek to avoid—such as
judgments about the similarity of the test to the target or policy population.
On the other hand, RCTs can be regarded as ‘debiasing procedure’ be-
cause they prevent researchers from allocating treatments to patients ac-
cording to their personal interests, so that the healthiest (or smartest or. . . )
subjects get the researcher’s favorite therapy. While unbalanced allocations
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can certainly happen by chance, randomization still provides some warrant
that the allocation was not done on purpose with a view to promoting some-
body’s interests. A priori, the experimental procedure is thus more impartial
with respect to the interests at stake. It has thus been argued that RCTs in
medicine, while no guarantor of the best outcomes, were adopted by the U.S.
Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) to different degrees during the 1960s
and 1970s in order to regain public trust in its decisions about treatments,
which it had lost due to the thalidomide and other scandals (Reiss and Teira
2013; Teira 2010). It is important to notice, however, that randomization
is at best effective with respect to one kind of bias, viz. selection bias. Im-
portant other epistemic concerns are not addressed by the procedure but
should not be ignored (Worrall 2002).
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6 Instrumentalism to the Rescue?
We have seen in Sections 2.4 and 4.1 that scientific objectivity and trust
in science are closely connected. We want scientific objectivity because and
to the extent that we want to be able to trust scientists, their results and
recommendations. One possible lesson to draw from the fairly poor success
record of the alternative conceptions of scientific objectivity is that these
conceptions have the logical order of the ideas mistaken. They look at some
privileged feature of science, define this feature as ‘objectivity-making’ and
then leave the issue of whether or not the feature also promotes trust to
fate. The obvious alternative is to reverse that order, start with what we
want and then look for features that might promote the thing in which we
are ultimately interested.
If ultimately it is trust in science we want, we might then define as ‘ob-
jective’ any feature of science that promotes trust (cf. Fine 1998: 18). That
is, anything goes—as long as the practice promotes trust in science. In con-
traposition to the three traditional alternatives, we may call this conception
instrumentalism about scientific objectivity.
From an instrumentalist point of view, defining the objective features of
scientific inquiry becomes an empirical and contextual issue. It is empirical
in that anything that stands in the right kind of causal relation with public
trust will count as an objective feature of science. There is no way to tell
a priori what these features might be. It is contextual in that there is
at least the possibility that these features vary with time, place, discipline
and other contextual elements. It may well be, for instance, that one or
more of the three traditional understandings have once promoted trust in
science, even if they no longer do so. It may also be that it is these features
that promote trust in one science but not others. And it may be that
trust-making features vary with social and political circumstances—different
features may be salient in different stages of development or between war
and peace times and so on.
The strong point of this way of thinking about objectivity is that none
of the threats discussed in the main body of this article—threats posed by
the difficulties with the ‘view from nowhere’, with the value-free ideal, and
with biases and idiosyncrasies in science—puts scientific objectivity at risk.
There is no reason to think that sciences that represent the world from a
perspective, in which non-epistemic values play important roles in scientific
decision-making and in which personal elements affect outcomes cannot be
trusted by the public. Scientific objectivity in the instrumentalist conception
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is thus both valuable, as gives us something worth pursuing, and attainable.
At the same time, arguably, instrumentalism about objectivity is more of
a research programme than an explication of the concept. Suppose we have a
domain of science which, at a particular place and time, fares very well with
respect to promoting public trust. How are we to tell which features of these
scientific practices are responsible for the success? It is obviously impossible
to run experiments. Just observing and comparing historical episodes is not
likely to clinch results as there will always be numerous differences between
any two domains, historical episodes and places.
Moreover, if objectivity is identified with features that promote trust in
science, how do we prevent clever marketing from being a crucial feature
of scientific objectivity? Or suppose that a science loses public trust (say,
as macro and financial economics did after the Financial Crisis after 2007).
What might be effective strategies to regain it? Arguably, instrumentalism
raises more questions than it answers.
Yet, instrumentalism faces none of the obvious difficulties of the alterna-
tive views, so it might well be a worthwhile research project. The challenge
for proponents of traditional views of objectivity consists in showing how
specific features of their favorite conception of objectivity (e.g., value free-
dom) secure the epistemic authority of science independent of contextual
constraints, and how these features have been used at all times for sup-
porting the credibility of scientific claims. The instrumentalist and realist
research programs may therefore fruitfully complement each other.
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7 Conclusions
So is scientific objectivity desirable? Is it attainable? That, as we have
seen, depends crucially on how the term is understood. We have looked in
detail at three different conceptions of scientific objectivity: faithfulness to
facts, value-freedom and freedom from personal biases. In each case, there
are at least some reasons to believe that either science cannot deliver full
objectivity in this sense, or that it would not be a good thing to try to do
so, or both. Does this mean we should give up the idea of objectivity in
science?
We have shown that it is hard to define scientific objectivity in terms
of a view from nowhere and freedom from values and from personal bias.
It is a lot harder to say anything positive about the matter. Perhaps it is
related to a thorough critical attitude concerning claims and findings, as
Popper thought. Perhaps it is the fact that many voices are heard, equally
respected and subjected to accepted standards, as Longino defends. Perhaps
it is something else altogether. Perhaps it is a combination of several factors,
including some that have been discussed in this article.
However, one should not (as yet) throw out the baby with the bathwater.
Like those who defend a particular explication of scientific objectivity, the
critics struggle to explain what makes science objective, trustworthy and
special. For instance, our discussion of the value-free ideal (VFI) revealed
that alternatives to the VFI are as least as problematic as the VFI itself,
and that the VFI may, with all its inadequacies, still be a useful heuris-
tic for fostering scientific integrity and objectivity. Similarly, although an
‘unbiased’ science may be impossible, there are many mechanisms scientists
can adopt for protecting their reasoning against undesirable forms of bias,
e.g., choosing an appropriate method of statistical inference.
Whatever it is, it should come as no surprise that finding a positive char-
acterization of what makes science objective is hard. If we knew an answer,
we would have done no less than solve the problem of induction (because
we would know what procedures or forms of organization are responsible for
the success of science). Work on this problem is an ongoing project, and so
is the quest for understanding scientific objectivity.
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